by Lead Rescue LLC
Generated from docs/VERIFYING.md in the SafeShip repository.
SHA-256 of that source file:
cdf7d6efe1990e306979805e5b8a9c6dfd7bfaeb26259d5a4600122ce7897b22
The same file ships in every release bundle and is covered by its SHA256SUMS. If the copy you received does not match this digest, do not rely on either — ask us.

Verifying a SafeShip release

Every release is a wheel, a SHA-256 checksum, and a detached OpenPGP signature. Verifying them answers two different questions, and it is worth being precise about which:

It catches a truncated download or a corrupted mirror. It does not tell you who published it, because anyone who can replace the wheel can replace the checksum next to it.

below. That is the part an attacker cannot forge by controlling the download.

The signing key

Lead Rescue LLC <saul@sitesbysaul.com>
ed25519, created 2026-09-20, expires 2028-09-19

D017 DFB5 0C40 9013 3506  30C4 766C 14D8 D079 136A

This is the same organizational key used for Lead Rescue LLC's other software (ULTIMA). The public key ships as safeship-signing-key.asc.

Confirm the fingerprint out of band. Importing the key from the same place you downloaded the wheel proves only that both came from the same source — if that source is compromised, so is the key you just trusted. Compare the fingerprint against a channel the download cannot control: a signed email from Lead Rescue LLC, a contract or invoice, the vendor's website over HTTPS, or a phone call. A fingerprint that only ever arrived alongside the artifact is not independent evidence.

Verify

# 1. Integrity
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS

# 2. Authenticity
gpg --import safeship-signing-key.asc
gpg --verify safeship-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl.asc \
             safeship-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl

A good signature prints:

gpg: Good signature from "Lead Rescue LLC <saul@sitesbysaul.com>"

GnuPG will also warn that the key is not certified with a trusted signature. That is expected and is not a failure: it means you have not personally signed this key, which is what the out-of-band fingerprint check above replaces. What matters is Good signature and that the key id in the output matches the fingerprint above.

If verification fails

Stop. Do not install the wheel.

the one published here: treat the artifact as untrusted and contact Lead Rescue LLC through a channel you already trusted before the download.

the import step.

period the key was live, but confirm the current key with the vendor before relying on it.

Reproducing the build

The wheel is byte-for-byte reproducible from its source revision. SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH is pinned to the commit timestamp, so the same commit always produces the same wheel, and ops/release-check.sh builds twice and refuses to publish if the two disagree. If you hold the source, you can rebuild a revision and confirm the digest matches the one that was shipped rather than taking the published checksum on trust.

Key rotation

This key expires 2028-09-19. A replacement will be published with its own fingerprint, and the change announced through the same channel you used to confirm the fingerprint originally. If a key is ever compromised, Lead Rescue LLC publishes a revocation certificate; an imported key that later shows as revoked should be treated as untrusted for every artifact you have not already verified.